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Recent emergence and popularity of mobile ad hoc networks in a host of
current-day applications has instigated a suite of research challenges, primarily in
routing and security issues for such networks. The ease and low cost of
deployment make this networking paradigm very convenient for group-oriented
applications like battlefield missions, business conference, virtual classroom, etc.
Such networks are characterized by wireless “links”, lack of any fixed network
infrastructure, rapidly changing topology and mobile hosts.
Security for these dynamic ad hoc networks presents many challenges in the
area of multicasting for group-oriented tactical missions, operating in a hostile
environment. Key-management and secure-routing have been the primary
research focus in this area. Source authentication for multicast is also a
fundamental problem that needs to be addressed.
In this work, we study some of the proposed source authentication schemes
for multicast group communication and evaluate one such scheme for a tactical
ad hoc set-up. We propose solutions that exploit the hierarchical nature of
tactical networks to achieve time synchronization pre-requisites that the
proposed schemes have.
We define metrics to evaluate the authentication scheme and present
simulation results for the authentication scheme evaluated with two different
time synchronization techniques. We find that our selected authentication
scheme is well suited for a mobile ad hoc network. We show that our solution for
time synchronization performs much better than conventional methods suggested
for the authentication scheme. We also discuss applications of our overlay
architecture for bootstrapping the authentication scheme with reduced
communication overhead.
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A mobile adhoc network (MANET) [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6] is a dynamically changing
multi-hop network created by a set of wireless mobile nodes that cooperatively
and spontaneously interact without any fixed infrastructure or centralized
authority. A node communicates directly with nodes within wireless transmission
range and indirectly with all other destinations using a dynamically-determined
multi-hop route, relying on other nodes to act as routers. These networks can be
formed, merged and partitioned on the fly.
MANETs can be of different kinds depending on the application. It is
possible to use very small and common devices as nodes. For example, an ad hoc
network can be formed in a conference room between PDAs, laptops and cellular
phones of the members. A completely different scenario could be a group of
soldiers, planes and tanks operating in a hostile environment. Tactical military
operations are by far the most widespread application of MANETs. Figure 1.1
shows a typical tactical MANET. These networks are hybrid and hierarchical in
nature. Still, much of the research in the area of ad hoc networks assumes a peer
1
Figure 1.1: A tactical MANET: Soldiers, planes, copters and tanks operate in a
battlefield in a hierarchical fashion, forming groups at different levels
2
to peer setting.
Other potential applications of MANETs include disaster response, audio and
video conferencing, gaming applications and various forms of ubiquitous
computing.
The following are the salient features of a MANET –
• Dynamically changing topology
• Poor physical protection of nodes
• Bandwidth limitations
• Energy constrained nodes
• Wireless communication medium and mobile hosts
1.1 Ad hoc network security
Topology changes, bandwidth limitations and energy constraints pose various
problems in the absence of a fixed infrastructure in hybrid, dynamic ad hoc
wireless networks. Securing such MANETs is a particularly challenging task
because of the vulnerability of the wireless “links”, poor physical protection of
the nodes, the sporadic nature of connectivity and the dynamically changing
topology. The absence of a certifying authority and the lack of a fixed
infrastructure or a centralized management point make the task all the more
challenging [4].
3
1.1.1 Threats and vulnerabilities
The threats and vulnerabilities of MANETs have been discussed in detail in
[1, 3, 4]. We summarize below the main challenges.
• Attacks due to vulnerability of wireless “links” –
These include passive eavesdropping, active impersonation, message replay,
message distortion, injection of erroneous messages, congestion or denial of
service, etc.
• Attacks due to compromised nodes –
Poor physical protection of nodes in a hostile environment results in a
non-negligible probability of a node being compromised. Attacks launched
from within the network by compromised nodes should be taken into
consideration. The security mechanisms should not be based on a central
entity to avoid single point(s) of failure in the network. It is also important
to ensure that the system fails gracefully. In general, the failure of a single
node should not jeopardize the security of the system as a whole.
• Attacks due to vulnerability of security mechanisms –
These include malicious replacement of public keys, compromise of keys,
etc. The security mechanisms should be resistant to both passive and
active adversaries. Recently, there have been a number of side-channel
attacks on many popular cryptosystems. These attacks do not break the
4
security mechanism as such, but use information like padding in messages,
key-strokes, power analysis, etc to recover the key. The key recovery is not
due to the weaknesses in the security mechanism. Examples include
electromagnetic and differential power analysis techniques to break
smart-card security and padding attacks on Cipher-block-chaining mode of
encryption.
• Denial of Service threats –
A Denial of Service (DoS) can be created by malicious nodes or by
unintentional failure of node(s) in the network. Forms of DoS vary from a
simple flooding of a resource to congesting parts of the network to
reconfiguration of routing protocol by malicious nodes leading to Byzantine
failures.
1.1.2 Security-related Requirements
The security requirements depend largely on the mission and operating
conditions of the MANET. For military applications, the requirements will be
stringent in terms of confidentiality and resistance to DoS attacks. For example,
we might have to ensure that wireless traffic does not reveal the location of a
target to the enemy in a military mobile ad hoc network while it is not necessary
to do so in a civilian ad hoc network. The following are the general security
requirements in a MANET [1, 3, 4]. Depending on the application, the
5
constraints and requirements would eliminate or make more critical one or more
of the following or have added restrictions.
• Authentication –
The receiver of a message must be able to verify the identity of the
originator of the message, thereby preventing an intruder from
masquerading as a legitimate source of the message.
• Integrity –
The receiver of a message should be able to check whether a message was
modified in transit. This is to avoid accepting packets that have been
modified by a hostile node, while in transit.
• Confidentiality –
Confidentiality is needed to ensure that certain information (like tactical
military information or routing information that might reveal the location
of the target) is never disclosed to unauthorized entities. Confidentiality is
required only when the message is to be kept secret.
• Non-repudiation –
The originator of the message cannot deny having sent the message.
Non-repudiation is useful for detection and isolation of compromised nodes.
• Availability –
Availability ensures functionality of network services despite DoS attacks.
6
The security mechanisms should not make any assumptions about the
availability of specific nodes at any given time. Nodes may be idle, shut
down for a while or could be compromised.
• Access Control –
Some systems may require that only certain nodes be entitled to perform
certain tasks, e.g posting certain messages (commands/orders), revoking a
certain policy / trust information, etc. Access control mechanisms must be
established to deal with these issues.
• Scalability –
Security mechanisms may be required to be scalable to handle a large
number of nodes, depending on the application.
• Adaptability to changes –
Frequent changes in topology and membership make the ad hoc network
dynamic. Trust relations among nodes also change with time and so does a
node’s affiliation with an administrative domain. The security mechanisms
should not have a static configuration and should be able to adapt to
changes on the fly.
• Key Management –
The only way to accurately enforce authentication, integrity and
non-repudiation is by using some form of cryptography, which requires the
7
distribution/exchange of encryption/authentication key information among
message senders and receivers. A key management module consists of a
trust model, a cryptosystem, key establishment module, a key storage and
key distribution service. Some group-oriented applications may require key
revocation services as well.
1.2 Multicast in MANETs
Multicast means being able to deliver a packet to a set of destinations. Multicast
communication enables one-to-many or many-to-many communication as
opposed one-to-one supported by unicast. A source can send the same packet
simultaneously to multiple destinations without any repetitive transmissions. In
IPv4, a multicast address is designed to enable the delivery of datagrams to a set
of hosts that have been configured as members of a multicast group across
various subnetworks [7, 8].
Multicasting allows a sender to transmit voice, video and text to multiple
receivers simultaneously. Broadcast is one-to-all communication and is a special
case of multicast. When sending the same packet to multiple receivers, multicast
improves bandwidth utilization and involves lesser host/router processing. The
typical applications of multicast are multi-party video or audio conferencing,
resource discovery, news feeds, online games, TV/video transmissions (Pay Per
View TV), etc. In most ad hoc networks, nodes work in groups to perform a
8
given task and hence multicast plays an important role. Several multicast routing
algorithms have been proposed for MANETs. These include MAODV[9],
ODMRP[10], MCEDAR[11], AMRoute[12], MOSPF[13] etc.
1.2.1 Multicast security
Multicast security issues and proposed solutions have been studied in [14, 15].
The primary objectives of a multicast security infrastructure are to maintain
secrecy and guarantee authentication for all group communication so that only
legitimate senders can multicast packets to the group and only packets sent by
legitimate group members are accepted. Other security concerns include
anonymity, non-repudiation, access control, trust issues, maintaining service
availability to protect the network from clogging attacks, etc. Security in
multicast is thus considerably more complicated than in the unicast case. Most
unicast solutions are prohibitively inefficient for multicast scenarios.
Factors affecting security [15] are group type, group size, member (node)
characteristics (power, storage, availability), membership dynamics, membership
control, number and type of senders, volume and type of traffic and routing
algorithm used. Attacks on routing mechanisms are becoming widespread. Thus
multicast security is a fairly complex multi-faceted, multi-layered problem. These
requirements are even more difficult to fulfil in ad hoc networks where
bandwidth, storage and energy constraints of the nodes pose additional problems
9
when coupled with mobility and dynamically changing topology in the absence of
a centralized infrastructure.
1.3 Motivation and Problem Definition
In group communications, establishment of a shared session key does not
“secure” communication within the group. If messages are encrypted with the
session key, then confidentiality (privacy) of the message is guaranteed. This
alone does not prevent a legitimate group member from masquerading as another
member. There are several routing-related attacks that any node (group member
in the context of multicast) can cause in the absence of authentication. These
have been discussed in [16]. These include, but are not limited to, injecting
erroneous routing messages, selectively forwarding only routing packets, creating
black holes, worm-holes , creating DoS attacks, causing a vertex cut or network
partition, etc. These attacks are however not specific to multicast settings. Even
if the multicast routing protocol is secure against all possible routing-related
attacks, there is nothing to prevent one group member from spoofing as another.
Hence, multicast security is not guaranteed by “securing” the routing and having
a “secure” group key management scheme. Source authentication is an important
security concern that needs to be addressed.
Authentication in a group can be of two types [14] – Group Authentication
and Source Authentication. Group authentication means that a group member
10
can distinguish the sender of the message as a group member or non-member.
Source authenticity means that a member can identify the purported sender of
the message within the group (or outside).
Our goal is to study existing source authentication schemes and explore if any of
the proposed schemes can be used to guarantee source authenticity for multicast
in a tactical MANET, modify or propose new schemes if necessary and to
quantify the candidate scheme by simulation in a realistic multicast setting in
wireless, mobile, ad hoc mode.
For example, in a tactical MANET, an enemy aircraft can spoof its identity
and try to join a group. If it is in the vicinity, it can eavesdrop on all
communication in range. If a node is compromised by the enemy, it can learn the
session key and the enemy can silently listen to and intercept all communication
and pose as a legitimate soldier/node. Worse still, it can give false “orders” (e.g
to dissolve the group and retreat, to lie in ambush in a different place, etc). All
these attacks can be prevented with source authentication. The problem of
detecting compromised nodes without any central authority is hard, especially in
a MANET and is beyond the scope of this work. We assert that our goal is to




We propose a source authentication scheme, Tesla, suggested by Perrig et al
[17, 18] as a candidate for achieving source authentication for multicast in a
MANET. We define metrics to evaluate the scheme and measure the performance
by simulations in different scenarios for a MANET. Our results show that the
scheme is suitable for group communication in MANETs. We describe means to
achieve some strong assumptions that Tesla is based on. We use a combination of
µTesla [19] and extensions to the basic Tesla scheme [17, 18] with additional
support for tactical mobile ad hoc networks. We also define a framework which
helps achieve some pre-requisites for the authentication scheme and also helps in
bootstrapping the authentication process. We simulate the authentication
scheme in Network Simulator [20], version 2.1b9a.
1.5 Organization of Thesis
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, some of the existing
multicast authentication schemes have been discussed. We propose one of these
schemes as a candidate source authentication scheme for multicast in MANETs.
However, this scheme requires loose clock synchronization among participating
nodes. Chapter 3 discusses the problem of time synchronization in a MANET.
We give details of the architecture proposed to efficiently bootstrap and
synchronize nodes in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 describes the simulation framework
12
and results. We present a brief qualitative security analysis along with the




As discussed in Section 1.3, source authentication involves authenticating the
purported sender (not necessarily a group member) of the message. Criteria for
judging source authentication solutions have been discussed in [14, 15]. These
include efficiency, reliability requirements, collusion-resistance, latency or delay in
authentication. In addition, non-repudiation, revocation, updating should be
feasible with minimal communication and computation overhead. Entity
authentication should provide for evaluation of the authenticity of an entity and
computation of trust values (opinions) conforming to the trust metrics.
Our goal is to develop a scheme that is a combination or improvement of one
or more of the existing schemes with additional support and modifications
needed for the ad hoc tactical set-up. In this work, we concentrate on schemes
for source authentication for group communication. We are not trying to secure
routing. Our scenario is a dynamic multicast group in a MANET, where
members join and leave on the fly. We assume the existence of a valid session key
(for data confidentiality) at any instant of time (it is updated as and when any
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change in membership occurs in the group). Source authentication is still needed
for the messages sent within the group and for messages sent to the group by a
non-member. We assume message authentication in this case to be equivalent
source authentication. Each receiver needs to know the ”correct” identity of the
sender.
In the rest of the chapter, we briefly outline previous solutions for the
problem and discuss two recent schemes, Tesla and µTesla in detail.
2.1 Previous Solutions
Authentication may be provided in many forms with varying degrees of assurance
from simple passwords transmitted in the clear to digital signatures based on
public key cryptography. For the unicast case, authenticity and integrity can be
guaranteed by using keyed message authentication codes (MACs).
• Sender and receiver share a secret key K.
• Sender sends < data, MACK(data) >
• Receiver gets < data, c > and verifies if c = MACK(data)
In case of multiple receivers, the problem becomes much harder to solve because
a symmetric approach would allow anyone holding a key (that is, any receiver) to
forge packets. Several solutions have been proposed for the multicast case
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[21, 22, 23, 24]. These have been reviewed in [14, 15, 25]. We briefly summarize
the proposed solutions.
• Sign each packet using public key signatures – Secure, but expensive in
terms of key generation and signature verification overhead.
• Stream signatures [23] – Only one regular signature is transmitted at the
beginning of the stream. Each packet contains a cryptographic hash of the
next packet. This scheme cannot tolerate packet loss. If the packet stream
being sent is not known apriori, the sender has to embed one-time keys and
signatures into the packet stream, resulting in a large overhead.
• Tree-based signatures [22, 24] and hybrid signature schemes [21] – Resistant
to collusion and packet loss, but size overhead is very large.
• Multiple MACs [15] – Sender maintains several keys, subsets of which are
shared amongst receivers in such a way that no subset of N receivers knows
all the keys known to any other receiver. This scheme is insecure when
there are more than N colluding parties. While N should be fairly large to
prevent collusion, a large number of MACs need to be concatenated to the
message, increasing the overhead on each packet.
The principal issues for a source authentication mechanism for multicast
[17, 18, 26] include loss tolerance, high efficiency, and no per-receiver state at the
sender. The problem is particularly hard in settings with high packet loss rates
16
and where specific packets in the sequence that are lost are not retransmitted,
and where the receiver wants to authenticate every packet that it receives . With
many receivers, we typically have a high variance in the bandwidth of the
receivers, with high packet loss for the receivers with relatively low bandwidth.
Nevertheless, we want to assure source authentication to work even in the
presence of wide variation in bandwidth among nodes. In the following sections,
we describe two such schemes proposed by Perrig, et al [17, 18, 26], which satisfy
several of the above requirements.
2.2 Tesla
Tesla (Timed Efficient Stream Loss-tolerant Authentication) [17, 18, 26], uses
only symmetric cryptographic primitives such as pseudo-random functions
(PRFs) and message authentication codes (MACs), and is based on delayed
disclosure of keys by the sender. The sender and the receiver are required to be
loosely time synchronized. Bootstrapping is done through a regular data
authentication system. A digital signature algorithm is used for this purpose, in
which case the receiver is required to have an authentic copy of either the sender’s
public key certificate or a root key certificate in case of a PKI (public-key
infrastructure). The MAC and the PRF must be cryptographically secure.
The basic scheme works as follows. The sender issues a signed commitment to
a key Ki that is known only to itself. The sender then uses that key to compute
17
a Message Authentication code (MAC) on a packet Pi and later discloses the key
Ki in packet Pi+1, which enables the receiver to verify the commitment and the
MAC of packet Pi. If both verifications are successful, packet Pi is authenticated.
The commitment is realized via a pseudo-random function, F with collision
resistance. The MAC key is derived from the key revealed in the packet using
another PRF F ′. K ′i = F
′(Ki) is the secret key used to compute the MAC of the
next packet, and F (Ki) commits to the key Ki without revealing it. The
functions F and F ′ are two different pseudo-random functions. Commitment
value F (Ki) is important for the authentication of the subsequent packet Pi. To
bootstrap this scheme, the first packet needs to be authenticated with a regular
digital signature scheme, for example RSA [27]. When receiver R receives Pi+1,
Ki is disclosed and R first verifies that Ki is correct by checking if F (Ki) and the
commitment sent in packet Pi match. R computes K
′
i = F
′(Ki) to check the
integrity of Pi by verifying the MAC in Pi. Similarly, Pi+1 is authenticated after
the receipt of Pi+2 and so on.
There are a number of problems with this scheme. First it is not resistant to
packet loss. If a subsequent packet is lost, then the previous packet cannot be
authenticated. Robustness to packet loss is achieved by using a one-way key chain
instead of using an independent key for each packet. The sender first chooses a
random key KN and computes Ki = F (Ki+1) for i = N − 1, · · · , 1, where N is the
length of the key chain. Ki = F
N−i(KN) for i = 1 · · ·N − 1. It uses the keys in
reverse order, i.e. the key, K0 is used to authenticate the first packet so that
18
P 1 P P 2 P 4 
K 1 = F(F(K 3 )) 
3 
Figure 2.1: Achieving robustness to packet loss: Use of a one-way key-chain enables
the receiver to authenticate packet P1, after receipt of P4 when P2 & P3 are lost.
when the next key, K1 is revealed, the key-authenticity can be verified by
checking if the hash (PRF) of the key revealed equals the key revealed in the
previous packet. Figure 2.1 shows an example to illustrate this concept. All
previous keys can be computed from a given key by repeated application of the
PRF F . This means that any key can be used to authenticate subsequent keys,
i.e. the receiver(s) can efficiently authenticate Kj given Ki(i < j) by verifying if
Ki = F
j−i(Kj). It is infeasible to derive Kj from Ki for (j > i). These properties
of the one-way key chain make the scheme robust to missing values (packets).
Even now, the scheme is not secure. What if the receiver gets packet Pi+1
before packet Pi? What if a man-in-the-middle attack is launched by an
adversary? The adversary can hold on to Pi until it gets Pi+1. The key Ki is
revealed in Pi+1 and the adversary can modify the message and compute the
MAC using the key and send these two packets one by one to the receiver. Thus
it is clear that receiver should be able to verify that the key used to compute the
MAC of a packet it received has not been disclosed by the sender until the time
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of receipt. This is called the “security condition”. This is possible if the sender
and receiver are loosely clock synchronized and the receiver knows the sender’s
key disclosure schedule - i.e the time of disclosure for a particular key.
If each packet discloses the key corresponding to the MAC of the previous
packet, then all packets received after a delay greater than the sender’s
key-disclosure-delay will be dropped by the receiver(s) when they try to verify
the key-authenticity as described above. To make the scheme adaptive to
network delays, the key is disclosed after d packets. The key Ki used to compute
the MAC of packet Pi is disclosed in packet Pi+d.
The receiver(s) however need to know the exact sending schedule of the sender
since the key-usage and disclosure is on a per-packet basis. To accommodate
dynamic sending rates, a key is tied to a period in time (one time interval) and
the same key is used to compute the MAC for all packets sent in a given interval.
The key Ki is used to authenticate packets sent in interval i and is disclosed in
interval i+ d. Figure 2.2 illustrates the concept of using one key per time interval.
The length of the key chain is significantly reduced by using one key per interval.
The choice of the parameter d is critical. A small value will make remote
receivers drop the packet. A large value of d increases the time to authenticate a
packet, requiring large buffer storage at the receiver. Clearly, there is a trade-off.
Simultaneous use of multiple authentication chains with different disclosure
periods helps accommodate heterogeneous receivers across the network. This
enables each receiver to use the chain with minimal disclosure delay, sufficient to
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time 
Figure 2.2: Tolerating dynamic sending rates: The figure shows the one way key-
chain and packets being sent at the sender. In this example, K ′1 derived from K1 is
used to authenticate packets P1 and P2 and is disclosed in packets P3, P4, P5 sent
in interval 3.
prevent spurious drops, which are caused if the security condition does not hold.
When operating in an environment with heterogeneous network delays for
different receivers, Tesla authenticates each packet using multiple keys, where the
different keys have different disclosure delays. This results in larger overhead,
both in processing time and in bandwidth. Using the same key chain for all
instances with a different key disclosure schedule for each instance reduces the
communication overhead. These extensions are discussed in detail in [17, 18, 26].
To summarize, Tesla has the following properties:
• Low computation overhead – The authentication involves typically only one
MAC function and one hash function computation per packet, for both
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sender and receiver.
• Low per-packet communication overhead – Overhead can be as low as 10-20
bytes per packet.
• Resistant to packet loss – Every packet that is received in time can be
authenticated.
• No sender-side buffering – every packet is sent as soon as it is ready.
• High guarantee of authenticity – The system provides strong authenticity.
By strong authenticity, we mean that the receiver has a high assurance of
authenticity, as long as the timing and cryptographic assumptions are
enforced.
Tesla is tailored for multicast. A new group member only needs to synchronize its
time with the sender and receive the sender’s key disclosure schedule along with
a commitment to the key chain. An initial authenticated packet is still required
to bootstrap the authentication process. Tesla uses a digital signature based
periodic broadcast scheme for this purpose. The sender periodically broadcasts
an interval specification message, digitally signed with its private key. The initial
authenticated packet contains the precise interval information (interval frequency
and the starting time of a specific interval) along with the key of a past interval.
22
2.3 µTesla
µTesla [19] was used in sensor networks for authenticated broadcast. µTesla uses
only symmetric mechanisms to authenticate the initial packet unlike Tesla, which
uses digital signatures, which are too expensive for resource-constrained
environments. µTesla uses the node-to-Base station authenticated channel to
bootstrap the authenticated broadcast. The sender uses one key per epoch and
discloses the key in a separate key disclosure packet. A single key is used to
compute the MAC of all packets sent in a given interval. µTesla restricts the
number of authenticated senders. Loose time synchronization between the nodes
is assumed.
Two modes of communication are supported by µTesla.
1. Base station (BS) broadcasts authenticated packets to nodes (BS is the
Sender)
• Sender Set-up: BS chooses a random key and generates a one-way key
chain.
• Broadcasting authenticated packets: BS associates each key of the
key-chain with one time interval t. BS uses the current key Kt to
MAC packets sent in interval t. BS reveals the key Kt after a delay of
“key-disclosure-delay” intervals after the end of time interval t.
• Bootstrapping a new receiver: Receiver sends a nonce with its request
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to the sender (BS) who replies with its current time, a key Ki of the
key-chain, the key disclosure schedule (starting time of interval i,
duration of a time interval, the disclosure delay) along with a MAC
using the shared key between the node and the BS.
• Authenticating broadcasts: Receiver first verifies the security
condition when it receives a packet. It then authenticates the key and
finally verifies the MAC when it receives the disclosure packet
revealing the MAC key.
2. Nodes broadcast authenticated data (Any node is the sender)
• A node broadcasts data through the base station using the secure
channel between the node and the BS to send data in a reliable way to
the BS, which then broadcasts it.
• Alternatively, a node broadcasts the data while the BS keeps the
one-way key-chain and sends keys to the node as and when needed. To
conserve energy at the broadcasting node, the BS can also broadcast
the key disclosure packets and perform the initial bootstrapping.
The two schemes described in this chapter provide efficient means to
authenticate the source. They differ in their bootstrap mechanisms and
key-usage. However, loose clock synchronization among the participating nodes is
a pre-requisite for both. This is a very strong assumption. Some general
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solutions are outlined in [17, 19, 26]. Some of these solutions are not applicable
to a MANET. In the following chapter, we discuss time synchronization issues in
a MANET. We discuss the pros and cons of some of the proposed solutions and
suggest some for our tactical set-up.
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Chapter 3
Time Synchronization in a MANET
In Tesla and other applications like SPINS [19] and Ariadne[16], loose clock
synchronization between nodes is assumed at the start. Loose time
synchronization means that the synchronization does not need to be precise, but
that the receiver(s) must know an upper bound on the dispersion (the maximum
clock offset) between the sender’s clock and itself. The solutions outlined in
[17, 18, 16, 26] are not suitable for a MANET. In a tactical MANET, the
requirements and constraints are different.
In this chapter, we describe the requirements for achieving loose clock
synchronization in a MANET in order to implement Tesla. Next, we discuss
some of the common time synchronization schemes and reason why each of those
would not fare well in our case. We also mention some possible attacks that
should be taken into consideration for a tactical MANET. We then proceed to
exploit the hierarchical nature of present-day tactical networks and emphasize
that an overlay will help not only in time synchronization, but also in routing
and key distribution.
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3.1 Requirements and Related Work
All nodes in the MANET should be loosely clock synchronized, i.e. each node
should know a rough upper bound on the dispersion between its clock and that of
a sender from whom it receives data in the group. The receiver need not know
the real difference δ, between the sender and receiver’s time but only some 
that is guaranteed to be greater than or equal to δ [17, 18, 26]. Ideally, any time
synchronization scheme that is robust against active adversaries can be used.
Tesla supports two synchronization methods, direct and indirect synchronization.
In direct synchronization, the receiver synchronizes its time directly with the
data sender while in indirect synchronization both the sender and the receiver
synchronize their time with a common (external) time synchronization service.
In the basic protocol described in [17], the receiver sends a request to the
sender with a nonce (to prevent replay). The sender replies with its current time
tS along with its key disclosure schedule and an initial commitment to its
key-chain. This packet is signed with a regular signature scheme. The maximum
time discrepancy, dt is one Round Trip Time (RTT). This solution however does
not scale well. There is a bottleneck at the sender when there are a large number
of receivers.
Direct time synchronization has a few disadvantages over indirect time
synchronization in terms of communication overhead and the possibility of a
Denial of Service (DoS) attack at the sender. This is clearly avoided in indirect
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synchronization where the nodes synchronize their time with a common external
trusted time synchronization service.
An alternate solution using secure distributed time-servers is described in
[18]. Initially, the sender synchronizes its time with the time-server and computes
the maximum synchronization error. It then broadcasts the maximum
synchronization error periodically along with the interval information. Receivers
can independently synchronize their time with the synchronization server and
individually compute their maximum synchronization error. The receivers add up
all the synchronization error values to verify the security condition. A third
solution is proposed in [26] for the multicast scenario. Senders and receivers
synchronize their time with time-servers dispersed across the network after which
every node knows the time and the maximum synchronization error. The sender
periodically broadcasts a signed bootstrap packet along with its offset to the
server’s clock. A receiver waits for a bootstrap packet. It computes the
synchronization error between itself and the sender as the sum of the
synchronization errors of the sender and itself. This works if the sender and
receiver have a method to synchronize time and the receiver knows the upper
bound of the synchronization error. The time-servers distributed across the
network should be synchronized with each other.
The mobility and adhoc-ness involved in MANETs make each of the above
methods inefficient and practically un-scalable. This is tantamount to saying that
the difference in clocks between any two nodes should not be more than a
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threshold. Each node should know a rough upper bound of the maximum clock
difference that can be tolerated by the authentication scheme (or any other
application for that matter). Loss of a time synchronization packet should not
prevent other nodes from updating their timing information. This implies that
we cannot use a concept of “global” time, where nodes update their time based
on the clocks of their peers. This is not practical for MANETs.
For each multicast group, an associated group leader maintains the tree in case of
MAODV and other tree-based protocols. The group leader could send out
beacons containing timing information periodically. The receiver need not
contact the sender in this case. It just waits for a beacon from the group leader.
This method is not resistant to packet loss. A major discrepancy arises if a node
is a member of two groups at the same time whose senders have a huge clock
difference. The group leader itself is likely to change with dynamic changes in
topology. When a non-member sends a packet to the group, this method fails
and one needs to revert to the aforementioned methods.
Many time synchronization services for sensor networks use Reference Broadcast
Service (RBS) [28] as a means to achieve time synchronization. All these
methods involve message exchanges between the receivers. This is not efficient
and scalable for a MANET. [29] discusses time synchronization techniques for ad
hoc networks.
Taking all the issues discussed in this section into consideration, we arrive at
the following set of requirements:
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• All nodes should be loosely time synchronized with each other, since any
node can be a sender.
• No message exchanges – A node should not have to send a message to the
time-server or sender for synchronization.
• A node should not depend on “many” other nodes for updating its clock.
• Timing information should be refreshed periodically if necessary.
• The time synchronization packet should be reliable - needs source
authentication and integrity guarantee. Confidentiality is not required.
• Congestion and collision should not pose major problems.
3.2 Threats
We also need to keep in mind the possible attacks on such a time synchronization
service. [30] examines the security requirements of accurate time services and
analyses the security of NTP [31]. The following are the common attacks on a
time-synchronization service, as discussed in [30].
• Masquerade – An attacker can try to impersonate the time-server.
• Tamper – Attacker can modify the packet containing timing information.
• Replay – Attacker can replay (re-send) old messages.
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• Denial of Service (DoS) – The attacker can intercept the time-server’s
messages and delete them. The attacker can flood the network with
spurious packets or intercepted packets.
• Delay – The attacker can intercept and hold on to these packets and release
them after sometime, introducing long and often unacceptable transmission
delays.
3.3 Solutions
Current day solutions for time synchronization in computer networks [32]
include: Terrestrial communication systems like TV and telephone (modems),
Direct radio broadcasts (WWV, WWVH), Navigation systems like GPS,
Loran-C, Satellite Communication Systems like Two-Way Satellite Time Transfer
(TWSTT), etc. We briefly discuss some of these with their pros and cons.
3.3.1 Satellite
Suppose we have a satellite that periodically broadcasts the timing information
to all the nodes of the MANET. In a typical battlefield scenario, a MANET
would range over 25Km X 25km. A single satellite can cover this area and can
broadcast timing data in a bandwidth-effective and cost-effective manner.
Satellites have been effectively used for Internet applications. The benefits of
using satellite via Internet include [33] high bandwidth, untethered
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communication, simple network topology, more manageable network
performance, and broadcast/multicast capability. The only disadvantage is the
communication latency between two nodes connected by a satellite. We do not
need two-way links with the satellite for time synchronization.
The time synchronization information needs to be authenticated. A simple MAC
using a shared key could serve the purpose. Encryption or signature with a
private key can also be used.
The following are the prime issues that need to be taken care of:
• The communication latency
• The cost of having a receiving antenna in each MANET node
• Weather disturbances that render the system inoperable.
If on the other hand, we had an intermediate network between the satellite and
the MANET, then the cost of a receiving antenna as well as the probability of
failure due to weather conditions might be reduced.
3.3.2 GPS
The GPS satellite system consists of 24 satellites in 10,000-mile orbits, each
circling the earth twice a day and broadcasting radio navigation signals. GPS
provides specially coded satellite signals that can be processed in a GPS receiver,
enabling the receiver to compute position, velocity and time. Four GPS satellite
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signals are used to compute positions in three dimensions and the time offset in
the receiver clock. GPS provides timing accuracy in the 300ns range. Some
well-designed GPS clocks can remain accurate with only one satellite in view.
GPSClock-200 is a GPS receiver, which is optimized for computing the exact
time. It can keep time accurate to a few milliseconds of a second [34, 32].
Benefits – The benefits of GPS include high accuracy, high reliability, worldwide
access, precise time worldwide (system wide), reduced calibration cost,
small size, low power, low installation cost and low unit cost.
Issues – The satellite transmission for GPS requires a line of sight between the
receiver and the satellite. In fact, any bounced signals would just cause
erroneous readings, as the signal will be delayed by the additional distance
it has to travel, and the delay will throw off subsequent computations.
Noise, bias and blunders are other issues to be taken into consideration.
Weather conditions also affect the availability of the service. Installing a
GPS unit in some of the small, low power devices commonly used in
MANETs could be expensive in terms of cost of the natenna and GPS unit.
3.3.3 Overlay of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
Tactical MANETs are inherently hierarchical and hybrid in nature. In order to
minimize the cost of having a uni-directional link with a satellite, we could
exploit the underlying hierarchy of tactical MANETs to our advantage. In a
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tactical set-up, it is common to deploy one or more Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles(UAVs) above the MANET as an overlay depending on the area covered
by each UAV. The UAVs are high-power, high memory nodes. All nodes in the
MANET are equipped with receiving antennas. Thus, we can use distributed and
secure timeservers (UAVs) to perform the required loose clock synchronization by
indirect methods. The hierarchy of synchronization servers (overlay network)
ensures that only the maximum errors need to propagate. This is somewhat
analogous to the base stations in µTesla. This scheme is thus scalable and
suitable for multicast, enabling easy joining-member time synchronization
without the new member (receiver) needing to send any messages to the sender.
For most cases, a single UAV can cover the entire MANET area. If need be,
one can deploy more UAVs to span the entire network, in which case, the routing
between the UAVs is bi-directional. The number of UAVs is small (usually one or
two), and the mobility of UAVs is not very high. Hence, routing between UAVs
can be done effectively by using a pro-active protocol that is efficient for a small
set of nodes. We make the following assumptions about the UAVs. They have
high storage, high energy and high computational power. Routing between UAVs
is bi-directional and effective. The UAVs are trusted entities and do not turn
malicious. We also assume that these vehicles are monitored and that their
compromise is detected. The communication between UAVs is secure. Each UAV
has a common key for all the valid nodes of the MANET. This common key is
needed for UAV authentication. We assume that the UAVs are synchronized at
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Current Time, UAV−ID, MAC(common (shared) Key, Current Time | UAV−ID)
Figure 3.1: Format of UAV Broadcast
all times with each other by a satellite or GPS or other means. The UAVs send
timing information in the format shown in Figure 3.1. The MANET nodes can
authenticate the packet by verifying the MAC with the UAVs’ key, common to
all nodes. It is easier to have a common key shared with all the nodes so that the
UAV can broadcast the timing information in one go in a bandwidth effective
manner. There are no added issues when a node moves from the footprint of one
UAV to another. Since it shares the same key with all the UAVs, it will be able
to authenticate the next timing broadcast that it receives from its current UAV.
Alternatively, the UAV can append its signature computed using its secret
key to the packet. Any node in the UAVs footprint can verify the signature using
the UAVs’ key. An adversary cannot masquerade as a UAV.
We can use GPS for time synchronization in the overlay network. The
accuracy achieved here is many orders more than what is required for the
authentication scheme. Hence, the MANET nodes can synchronize themselves
with the timing information received from the overlay network. The frequency of
overlay broadcast should be adjusted so as keep the time synchronization error
between two receivers lesser than that tolerated by the authentication scheme. All
the nodes need not have GPS-enabled receiving antennas. The cost is also lesser.
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The overlay of UAVs can be used to bootstrap the MANET nodes in an effective
manner. This is discussed in the next chapter.
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Chapter 4
Applying Tesla/µTesla to the overlay equipped
tactical MANET
We propose Tesla and µTesla as candidate algorithms for the MANET. In this
work, we evaluate the basic Tesla scheme along with some modifications
incorporated from µTesla. In this chapter, we discuss the assumptions made,
describe bootstrapping in the presence of overlay network and the tasks that the
sender and receiver have to perform. The next chapter discusses the simulation
details and experimental results.
4.1 Assumptions
We make the following network assumptions. We assume the presence and
availability of an overlay network of Unmanned Aerial vehicles (UAVs). Most
tactical networks are hierarchical in nature. The overlay node need not
necessarily be a UAV. For example. tanks can also act as overlay nodes. Since
tactical MANETs are hierarchical and have overlays, we are not specially
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deploying an overlay network just for time synchronization purposes. We also
assume that the UAVs are equipped with highly accurate GPS clocks. The
number of UAVs is decided based on the network area and on the footprint area
of the UAV. In most cases, a single UAV can span the entire network area. We
assume high storage and computation facilities in the UAV, in particular - we
assume that a UAV can store a symmetric key for every other node in the
MANET. The overlay node(s) shares a symmetric secret key individually with
each mobile node. The overlay node also has a single common key that it shares
with all the MANET nodes.
In order to provide effective time synchronization service to the MANET and
to fully exploit the power, memory and other facilities available to the
UAV-overlay, there should be a return path from a node in the MANET to the
UAV. We need some nodes (super-nodes) with two-way links that can send to
and receive from the UAVs. We can deploy one or more high power nodes that
have two-way links. This way, the ordinary nodes can contact the UAVs through
the high-power super-nodes when they need some information. However, for the
purposes of time synchronization, we do not need such nodes. Their presence will
help us exploit the overlay for other purposes.
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4.2 Sender Setup
The sender set up is exactly the same as in [26]. The sender splits time into
intervals of length Tint, the first interval I0, starting at time T0. The sender
determines the sending duration and the length of the key chain, N . Each sender
first generates a sequence of secret keys (key chain) by choosing the last key Kn
randomly. It generates the remaining keys by successively applying a one-way,
collision resistant, strong cryptographic hash function, F . Thus,
Ki = F (Ki+1) for i = 1 . . . N
Ki = F
N−i(KN) where F i(x) = F i−1(F (x)) and F 0(x) = x
The sender associates each key of the key chain with one time interval and
discloses the current key after a delay of the order of a few time intervals after
the end of the current time interval. For all packets sent in a given interval, i, the
sender uses key K ′i = F
′(Ki) for computing the MAC of the data in the packet.
This is done to avoid using the same key for commitment and MAC
computation. Key chain extensions and use of multiple authentication chains
have been discussed in detail in [17, 18, 26]. The sender now needs to bootstrap
its receivers in an authenticated manner.
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4.3 Bootstrapping
Each receiver needs to be bootstrapped and given one authentic key of the
one-way key chain as a commitment to the entire key chain for a particular
sender. The receiver also needs to know the key disclosure schedule of the sender.
Methods for bootstrapping have been discussed in [17, 18, 26]. Since ad hoc
networks are conceived on the fly and the senders are not likely to be known
apriori, pre-loading bootstrap information is not appropriate for ad hoc networks.
We thus have to resort to secret key or signature based schemes for
bootstrapping.
Tesla uses a regular signature scheme to sign the bootstrap information. This
is very expensive for resource constrained nodes. µTesla (SPINS) [19] uses the
node-to-base-station authenticated channel to bootstrap the authenticated
broadcast. The expensive signature is avoided, but it totally relies on the layer
above for bootstrapping. It also involves two-way communication between every
node and BS. In Ariadne [16], each node is assumed to have a secret key for
every other node in the network. The receiver sends a nonce with a request to
the sender. Sender replies with its current time, a key of its key chain, the
starting time of the interval, the duration of an interval and the disclosure delay.
Since confidentiality is not required, there is no need to encrypt the data. The
sender replies with the key disclosure schedule, a key chain commitment value
and a MAC of these values using the secret key that it shares with the requester
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(receiver). This scheme involves exchanges between the sender and the receiver.
It is also based on a very strong node assumption about keys. When many
receivers try to get bootstrapped to the same sender, there is a bottleneck at the
sender and the method does not scale well. In another method in Ariadne, a
trusted KDC is used and each node is assumed to share secret keys with the
KDC. An alternate protocol given in [16] can do without each node having every
other node’s key, but involves encrypted message exchange with the KDC. [26]
also gives the details of a similar exchange based method.
4.3.1 Solutions
Schemes involving exchanges between the sender and receiver are likely to have a
bottleneck at the sender when many receivers try to bootstrap to the same
sender and hence do not scale well. Schemes where the sender can multicast the
bootstrap packet in an authenticated manner will be efficient in terms of
communication overhead. The sender must use a digital signature or keyed MAC
for authentication. Digital signatures are expensive in terms of computation and
data-overhead. For keyed MACs, the sender needs to use a key that is common
to a set of receivers, which is not secure since any receiver can forge packets.
Thus, it is evident that the sender and the receiver should share a secret key in
order to authenticate the bootstrap packet.
The overlay network can be used to reduce the bottleneck at the sender. As
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discussed in Section 4.1 we can often deploy one or more high power nodes
(super-nodes) with two-way links to the overlay to aid the bootstrap process. In a
typical tactical MANET (Figure 1.1), it is common to have such special nodes in
the network. The sender should first find a back channel to its parent UAV. This
can be “learnt” from the routing information like Hellos and reverse route entries
in the routing table. Otherwise, the sender must initiate a “request” and learn
the path to the super-node. It can now route the bootstrap packet to the UAV
which would then send it to the members of the multicast group by a direct
broadcast (if multiple UAVs are present (unlikely), the packet must be sent to
other UAVs to reach the receivers that are not in current UAV’s footprint). Once
the sender registers an initial bootstrap packet with the overlay network, new
receivers can be bootstrapped easily by the overlay. Significant work has been
done in [35] for hierarchical physical networks and for unidirectional routing.
For authentication, we assume (Section 4.1) that each node in the overlay has
a unique shared secret key for every node in the MANET. Since a single UAV
can cover the entire MANET area in most cases, we assume that the overlay
network consists of a single UAV. Extending it to many UAVs if required is
trivial. The sender should use the secret key, KS−UAV that it shares with the
UAV to compute the MAC in the bootstrap packet. The UAV can verify the
MAC and authenticate the sender since KS−UAV is known only to the sender and
the UAV. However, a malicious super-node M could change the sender’s identity
to its own ID and replace the original sender S’s MAC with a new MAC
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computed using the key KM−UAV . There is no way the UAV can tell that this
packet was tampered with. The new MAC verifies correctly. A keyed MAC
would suffice only when all super-nodes are trusted at all times. To circumvent
this situation, the sender can encrypt its bootstrap packet with the secret key
(that it shares with the overlay nodes) and route it to the overlay through the
nearest super-node. The UAV can decrypt the packet and can be assured of the
fact that only the node associated with that key could have sent the packet. This
method guarantees confidentiality and integrity.
The UAV now needs to broadcast the bootstrap information to the MANET
nodes. It uses the common key that it shares with all the MANET nodes to
compute the MAC. The UAV then broadcasts this packet to the MANET nodes.
If necessary, it can make sure that only the group members can read the contents
of the the packet by encrypting it using the associated group’s session key. This
is somewhat similar to the base station based authenticated broadcast described
in [19]. However, any super-node can masquerade as a UAV since it knows the
common key and can transmit at the same frequency range as the UAV. The
UAV must append a signature computed on the hash of the message before
broadcasting it. All the nodes can verify the signature with the UAV’s public
key. Signature verification is not very heavy on computation as opposed to
signature generation. The MANET nodes only need to verify the signatures
generated by the high power UAVs. The signature guarantees sender authenticity
and unforgeability. All the nodes in a UAV’s footprint will be able to
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authenticate the packet.
• S −→ UAV: EKS,UAV (Bootstrap data), where E(.) is the encryption module
• UAV decrypts packet to get data D
• UAV computes SignSK(hash(D)), where Sign(.) is the signature, SK is
the UAV’s secret key
• UAV broadcasts data along with signature
• Ground node verifies signature
The receivers can wait for an authenticated broadcast from the overlay before
contacting the sender. On the other hand, if the sender is unable to find a path
to the super-node and route the bootstrap packet to the overlay, the receivers
will not get an authenticated broadcast of the bootstrap packet within the
wait-period. The receivers can contact the sender and get the bootstrap packet in
the conventional way, i.e. the signature based authentication as described in
Tesla or if it is not too expensive for each node to have a shared key with every
other node, the nonce-based exchange as used in SPINS. Using the overlay for
bootstrapping receivers thus makes the bootstrapping scheme adaptive and more
flexible. Once a sender registers an initial bootstrap packet with the overlay
network, subsequent receivers can be bootstrapped easily by the UAVs. If the
receiver already has a route to the nearest super-node, it can send a request to
the UAV through the super-node instead of sending a request to the sender. If, on
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the other hand, the receiver has a route to the sender, (or if the route to sender is
shorter than route to super-node in case it has routes to both sender and a
super-node), it can send a request to the sender in the conventional way. We
stress that if sufficient super-nodes are deployed, we need not use the nonce-based
exchange or the signature based authentication at all, thus overcoming the
shortcomings of bootstrapping mechanisms using in both Tesla and SPINS.
There are other added advantages of having an overlay network. The
public-private key pair can be used to send information (like routing information
or keys) to a specific node in the network. The UAV acts as a cluster-head with
additional memory and storage capabilities. Overlay can be made to detect
partitions and provide information to the nodes accordingly.
4.3.1.1 Locating the super-node
Every node should keep a log of the nearest super-node that has the power to
contact a UAV. Such super-nodes should broadcast ”Hellos” periodically and also
as and when they move. The other nodes should keep updating their
nearest-super-node info. Forward paths and reverse routes should be set-up to
the super-nodes. This has been discussed in detail in [35].
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4.4 Receiver tasks
When a node receives a bootstrap packet for a sender, it stores the packet in its
buffer after verifying the MAC using the common UAV key or the shared key
between the node and the sender, depending on who it receives the bootstrap
packet from. The receiver computes the synchronization error with the
information in the bootstrap packet. As in Tesla [17, 18, 26], the receiver first
verifies the security condition (4.1) for each incoming packet.
IntervalID(tR + Skew
clk
S−R) ≤ IntervalID(tS) + d (4.1)
Here IntervalID(.) is a function that assigns the index of the interval (for the
keying operation) corresponding to the time argument, tR is the packet arrival
time at the receiver, tS is the packet transmission time at the sender, d is the
disclosure delay (intervals) used in the scheme, and Skew clkS−R is the
synchronization difference between the sender and receiver clocks. Only packets
that satisfy the security condition are buffered. For every key disclosure packet,
irrespective of whether the security condition is satisfied or not, the receiver
checks the key authenticity using function F , updates the key commitment and
IntervalID corresponding to the latest known key in Tesla. It authenticates all
packets sent between the Interval-IDs of the last key disclosure packet and the
current key disclosure packet after verifying the MAC. Keys for intermediate
intervals are computed by repeated application of the pseudo-random function, F
on the latest key.
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Figure 4.1: Flowchart showing tasks performed at the receiver on receipt of a
bootstrap packet: After updating the key-commitment and sending schedule of
the sender, the receiver authenticates all packets waiting for keys at least as old as
that disclosed.
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Is there a packet
waiting for a key























disclose a key fresher
























Figure 4.2: Flowchart showing tasks performed at the receiver on receipt of a Tesla
packet.
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If on joining a group, a receiver receives packets being sent to the group but is
unable to authenticate them due to lack of bootstrap info, it must buffer the
packets and establish a return path to the current UAV through the nearest
super-node and request the UAV to supply bootstrap packets for the sender(s)
whose data it wishes to authenticate. If the receiver does not get any bootstrap
packets within a certain timeout interval, it must contact the sender S. If the
receiver still does not get any bootstrap packet for a certain reasonably large
maximum wait time (usually of the order of buffer-timeout), it retries sending
requests to the sender(or UAV). After trying for a predetermined number of





We used ns-2 [20] discrete event simulator with the CMU wireless extensions [36]
for our simulations. The IEEE 802.11 Distributed Coordination Function (DCF)
[37] as implemented in ns-2 was used as the Medium Access Control protocol.
The radio propagation distance at the physical layer was set to 200m for each
node. The channel capacity was 1Mbps. The communication medium is
broadcast and nodes have bi-directional connectivity. Our model does not
support radio capture [38] and packets are dropped in case of collisions. The
Two-Ray Ground Propagation Model [39] was used as the underlying propagation
model in the physical layer. According to this model,
Pr =
(Pt · Gt · Gr · h2t · h2r)
(d4)
(5.1)
where Pt is the transmission power, Pr is the reception power, Gt is the
transmitter antenna gain, Gr is the receiver antenna gain, ht is the height of the
transmitter antenna, hr is the height of the receiver antenna and D is the
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MANET Area 1000m x 1000m TSYN TIMEOUT 0.5 seconds
Node Tx Range 200m MAX TSYN TRIALS 10
Group Size 50 nodes Signature Generation Time 10 ms
MAX WAIT TIME 5.0 seconds Signature Verification Time 1 ms
Table 5.1: Simulation Set-Up
distance between the receiver and transmitter. Nodes were randomly placed in
an area of 1000m × 1000m. Since nodes were randomly placed, network
partitions can exist irrespective of the denseness of the network. For all our
simulations, we have one multicast group of fifty nodes.
We used MAODV [9] as the multicast routing protocol. The agent was
implemented as an application above the network layer so that the data packets
with a multicast address as the destination use MAODV as the routing protocol
and the unicast packets use the AODV [40] unicast route table. We used the
reference implementation of [41]. The MAODV-agent is a derived class of
AODV-agent class. We modified the forwarding routines in the code to support
broadcast instead of doing multiple unicasts to all activated next-hops in the
multicast routing table. The MAODV draft [42] mentions two ways of doing the
forward – multiple activated next-hop unicasts or a single broadcast. The
implementation in [41] had the former and we modified the code to support
broadcast-based forwarding. In a wireless, ad hoc environment, it does not make
sense to unicast a packet to each of the activated next-hops. The source becomes
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a bottleneck with high sending rates. To effectively test and measure the
performance of Tesla, we choose higher sending rates than usual. In a broadcast
setting, all nodes in range receive the packet and those that are tree members
forward the packet.
Each run simulates two methods to synchronize time – direct time
synchronization (DTS) and Indirect time synchronization (UAV-based).
• For the DTS case, each node sends a unicast request along with a nonce to the
source (sender) of the data packet. The sender returns a packet with its sending
schedule, key commitment and timing information. The sender signs its reply
using its secret key. The receiver verifies the signature and gets time
synchronization information. The dispersion is estimated as the difference
between the time of arrival of time synchronization request at the sender and the
time of despatch of request at the receiver (requester). After sending a request,
the receiver sets a timer and waits for TSYN TIMEOUT period. If it does not
receive a reply before this timer expires, it sends another request to the sender
and resets the timer. Sequence numbers are used to detect replays. A receiver
sends up to MAX TSYN REQUESTS to the sender.
• For the UAV case, we assume that all the nodes have bootstrap information
and that the UAV periodically broadcasts accurate time. We did so for ease of
implementation. This is an ideal case. For both the DTS and the UAV case, the
MANET nodes are modeled to have a clock drift of the order of 1 µ-second. The
UAV latency is of the order of 40 µ-seconds for current-day UAVs. Thus, the
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dispersion with the UAV’s GPS-clock is negligible for the purpose of our
simulations. So, we modeled the node to have a clock with a dispersion of the
order of 1 ms from the system clock. This is a pessimistic estimate. Also, in the
current simulations, all nodes join the group by the time the sender(s) start
multicasting data packets. So, in essence, all nodes wait for the same time for the
UAV broadcast. Thus without loss of generality, we can assume that the time at
a node is system time, add or subtract a uniformly distributed random value less
than 0.001 seconds.
Tesla was implemented above the network layer with both the direct and
indirect time synchronization schemes. Each sender is a CBR-generator attached
to a UDP-agent. The sender sends a fixed number of packets per second. On
receipt of a new data packet, irrespective of whether or not it has time
synchronization information, the receiver removes all packets that have waited for
more than MAX WAIT TIME. The MAX WAIT TIME is set to a reasonably
high value and packets that receive the key after this time are not delivered to
the application layer anyway. The values of specific variables, the MANET area
and other specifications of the simulation set-up are given in Table 5.1.
The authentication header of the data payload consists of the key disclosure
bit, interval-ID, sequence number and the MAC of the header and the data in the
packet. The packet header for DTS request packet consists of the source address
and nonce (or sequence number). The reply packet consists of the source and
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Figure 5.1: Data Structure for Implementing Buffer at Receiver Side
A receiver maintains a buffer to store unauthenticated data packets while
waiting for the key. The authentication buffer has a structure called minibuff for
each sender. Each minibuff entry has a sender-id, a flag indicating availability of
bootstrap information, the last known key for the sender, the interval schedule of
the sender consisting of the first interval’s id, the starting time of this interval,
the Tesla time interval and disclosure delay of the sender, and most importantly,
the dispersion between the sender’s clock and its own. There is a pointer, interval
list head to the head of the interval list – a linked list containing the interval-id, a
pointer to a list of packet arrival times, and a pointer to the next entry
corresponding to the next interval in which packets were received. The packet-list
contains the arrival times of incoming packets. The structure is as shown in the
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Figure 5.1.
For the direct synchronization scheme, the receiver has another buffer where
it buffers packets until it gets time synchronization and bootstrap information.
When a receiver gets the required information, all packets in this buffer are first
validated and moved to the main buffer if the security condition (4.1) is satisfied,
otherwise they are dropped. Also packets that have waited in the buffer for more
than MAX WAIT TIME are dropped. By purging the buffer every
MAX WAIT TIME seconds, we thus maintain a buffer whose dimension is
limited by time instead of memory space. In a period of MAX WAIT TIME
seconds, a node can receive at most (SendingRate × MAX WAIT TIME)
packets.
The Tesla time interval and disclosure delay were varied as simulation
parameters. We performed simulations for both static and mobile scenarios. The
simulation parameters were different for both the cases.
• For the static case, we varied packet size, packet generation rate, number of
senders (sources). Details of the simulations for the static case are discussed in
Section 5.3. Since in the static case, the multicast tree once established, remains
stable, our network consisted of 50 nodes, all of which were group members. We
did so for the sake of simplicity and to reduce the random seeds involved in our
experiments.
• While for the mobile case, we had a fixed packet size, a fixed sending rate and
one source. Our network consisted of 75 nodes, 50 of which were randomly chosen
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as group members. We used the random way-point mobility model [5]. The details
of the model as well as other simulation parameters are described in Section 5.4.
5.2 Performance Metrics
We define the following metrics to evaluate the performance of the source
authentication scheme.
• Percentage Buffered (%Buffered) – is defined as the ratio of the number of
packets received by the group members (receivers) that are buffered. As
described in Section 4.4, each receiver checks the security condition (4.1).
The packet is dropped if the security condition is violated. Else, it is
buffered and waits for the key. %Buff is thus a measure of the fraction of
incoming packets that satisfy the security condition. This mainly depends
on the routing delay and availability of bootstrap information.
• Percentage Authenticated (%Authenticated) – is defined as the percentage
of the number of packets received by the group members (receivers) that
are authenticated and delivered to the application. On receipt of a packet
that discloses a key, irrespective of whether or not it satisfies the security
condition, the receiver checks if the key revealed is fresher (newer, i.e.
interval id corresponding to the disclosed key is greater) than the last
known key for the associated sender. If the key revealed is fresher, the
receiver first verifies the authenticity of the key by repeated application of
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the pseudo-random function, F as many times as the difference in interval
id’s between the last known key and the newly disclosed key. It then checks
the buffer for packets waiting on this key and authenticates or drops them
depending on the outcome of the MAC-check. %Authenticated is thus a
measure of the fraction of incoming packets that are delivered to the
application. This mainly depends on the network conditions. Apart from
routing delays, packets can be dropped due to non-availability of bootstrap
information. Request implosion at sender could also affect the MAODV
good-put.
• Percentage Dropped (%Dropped) – is defined as the percentage of packets
received that are dropped. Packets are dropped in three cases – when the
security condition is violated on receipt, when the packet has been in the
buffer for MAX WAIT TIME and when the MAC does not verify correctly.
%Dropped = 100 − %Authenticated. This metric does not give any
additional information, but is convenient to compare and contrast in many
cases.
• Average Buffer Time or Authentication Delay – is the delay prior to
authentication. The time elapsed from the time of receipt of the packet to
the time of delivery to upper layer is the authentication delay. Only packets
that are delivered to the application layer after authentication count for
this measure.
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5.3 Simulation Results for static case
In this section, we present the results from various simulations performed with
static scenarios. We first studied the performance of Tesla on a static scenario.
In what we call the “ base runs”, our network consisted of a single group of 50
nodes with one Constant Bit Rate (CBR) source. The size of each data packet
was varied as a simulation parameter for the static case (64,128,256 bytes). The
number of such packets generated by each source was also varied (5,10,20 packets
per second). Source nodes start generating data at random instants of time. The
CBR source sends data packets to the multicast group address. This was done to
get a feel of the data delivery rate and routing delay associated with MAODV
and to assess the performance of Tesla in such settings. In our model, when a
source initially wants to send data, it instructs the routing algorithm to establish
the route to the multicast group address. The number of sources was one for the
base-runs. We also performed simulations with multiple sources (1, 2, 3, 4, 5)
and compared the performance in each case. While performing simulations for
multiple sources, the sources generate 64-byte packets at the rate of ten packets
per second (5.12 Kbps). Each simulation was run for 250 seconds. For each tuple
(packet size, data rate @ sender), simulations were run for time intervals of
0.5, 0.1, 0.25, 0.5 seconds and disclosure delays of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 intervals. Table 5.2
summarizes the simulation parameters for the static case.
On each graph, UAV denotes the indirect time synchronization scheme and
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Simulation Time 250 seconds
Packet Size: 64,128,256 bytes
Sending Rate: 5,10,20 pkts/sec
No. of Senders: 1,2,3,4,5
Time Interval: 0.05, 0.1, 0.25, 0.5 sec
Disclosure Delay: 1,2,3,4,5 intervals
Table 5.2: Simulation Parameters for Static Case
DTS denotes the direct time synchronization scheme. Both schemes were
simulated as described in Section 5.1.
5.3.1 Simulations with Single Source
The plots in Figure 5.2 for 64-byte packets sent at the rate of 5 packets/sec show
the %Authenticated, %Buffered, %Dropped and the Average Buffer Time vs.
Disclosure Delay for different values of the Tesla time interval for both the UAV
and the DTS-cases. The bigger the time interval, the longer it takes to
authenticate the packet and hence greater the buffer time or the authentication
delay. It also means that the probability of the security condition being violated
decreases as the interval size increases. When the disclosure delay is 1, no packet
satisfies the security condition on receipt if the end-to-end delay is greater than
the time interval. This happens when the time interval is 0.05 and 0.1 seconds.
Also, since only 5 packets are sent every second and the idea is to use the same
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Figure 5.2: Performance Evaluation for 50 nodes, 1 source, packet size 64 bytes,
data rate 5 packets/sec
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key to authenticate multiple packets (in one time interval), time interval values
lower than the sending rate are not “practical” from a key-usage and
buffer-maintenance point of view. The UAV case performs better in all cases
than the DTS cases. The performance is about 30% more on an average. With a
sending rate of 5 packets/sec in a static scenario, the throughput of MAODV is
high and almost all packets that are buffered get authenticated as well. This is
an indication of the fact that most key-disclosure packets are received by the
group members.
The plots in Figure 5.3, Figure 5.4 show the performance metrics for 64-byte
packets sent at the rate of 10 and 20 packets/sec respectively. As in the previous
case, the bigger the time interval, the longer it takes to authenticate the packet
and hence lesser packet drops due to violation of security condition (4.1) and a
larger buffer time. When the Disclosure delay is 1, no packet satisfies the security
condition on receipt if the end-to-end delay is greater than the time interval. As
before, the UAV case performs better in all cases than the DTS cases. With a
sending rate of 10 or 20 packets/sec in a static scenario, the traffic is heavy and
the congestion is high. The packets get delayed and hence the number of packets
that get buffered after validating the security condition drops slightly. The three
sets of graphs for different sending rates are rather similar in nature and nothing
concrete can be concluded about the effect of the variation in sending rates on
the performance metrics. The average buffer time is almost linear with disclosure
delay for a specific value on time interval. The buffer time actually depends on
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Figure 5.3: Performance Evaluation for 50 nodes, 1 source, packet size 64 bytes,
data rate 10 packets/sec
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Figure 5.4: Performance Evaluation for 50 nodes, 1 source, packet size 64 bytes,
data rate 20 packets/sec
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the product of the time interval and disclosure delay.
Figure 5.5, Figure 5.6, Figure 5.7 show the variation of the four metrics with
disclosure delay for different time intervals with a packet size of 128-bytes and
sending rates of 5, 10, 20 packets per second respectively. The percentage of
packets authenticated drops as compared to the previous case where the packet
size was 64-bytes. As mentioned before, the time interval value of 0.05 seconds
has no practical significance when the sending rate is less than 20-packets/sec.
Similarly, 0.1-second time interval is not relevant for sending rates less than 10
packets per second and so on for other values. There is no fixed pattern among
the metrics that vary for all values of the time interval.
Figure 5.8, Figure 5.9, Figure 5.10 show the performance of the
authentication scheme for packet size of 256 − bytes. When compared to the set
of graphs for 64-byte packets, the performance is significantly poorer in this case.
The Percentage of packets buffered and authenticated is lesser and the number
dropped is higher. The buffer time remains roughly the same as it depends
primarily on the d × Tint product, i.e. the absolute time of key-release after
sending the packet.
5.3.2 Simulations with Multiple Sources
In the second phase of our simulations, we evaluated the authentication scheme
coupled with the time synchronization methods on a 50-node group with
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Figure 5.5: Performance Evaluation for 50 nodes, 1 source, packet size 128 bytes,
data rate 5 packets/sec
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Figure 5.6: Performance Evaluation for 50 nodes, 1 source, packet size 128 bytes,
data rate 10 packets/sec
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Figure 5.7: Performance Evaluation for 50 nodes, 1 source, packet size 128 bytes,
data rate 20 packets/sec
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Figure 5.8: Performance Evaluation for 50 nodes, 1 source, packet size 256 bytes,
data rate 5 packets/sec
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Figure 5.9: Performance Evaluation for 50 nodes, 1 source, packet size 256 bytes,
data rate 10 packets/sec
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Figure 5.10: Performance Evaluation for 50 nodes, 1 source, packet size 256 bytes,
data rate 20 packets/sec
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1, 2, 3, 4 & 5 senders. Here, the packet size is set to 64 bytes and the senders send
packets at the rate of 10-packets/sec. The radio transmission range of a node is
200-meters. The average node degree is about 6.8. The average number of hops
from one end of the rectangular area to another is thus 7 hops.
As observed in the earlier plots, the variation of the metrics with the product
of time interval and disclosure delay is more starked than with just time interval
or disclosure delay. In Figure 5.11, the %Authenticated, %Buffered, %Dropped,
Average Buffer time are plotted against the absolute time lag in key-disclosure on
the sender side, i.e the d × Tint product.
For both the UAV and the DTS schemes, the percentage of packets received
that are buffered drops with an increase in number of senders. The congestion in
the network increases with an increase in number of senders. The degradation is
very obvious for the DTS scheme since the receivers are now trying to find
unicast routes to each of the senders and need to get replies back. Due to
congestion, a number of these requests and replies get dropped and some
receivers may even fail to get synchronized. The overlay network authenticates
about 75% more packets than the exchange-based scheme. The average buffer
time is roughly the same as the product of disclosure delay and time interval, as
predicted from the previous plots.
Figure 5.12 shows the MAODV delay and the average clock offset between
nodes. In DTS, the dispersion depends on the one-way propagation time of the
request from the sender to the receiver. In the presence of an overlay with
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Figure 5.11: Performance Evaluation for 50 nodes, Variable no. of sources, packet
size 64 bytes, data rate 10 packets/sec, 200m range
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Figure 5.12: MAODV Delay and Clock Dispersion for a multi-hop 50-node group
accurate GPS-clock, near perfect clock synchronization is achieved at the cost of
an extra receiver antenna and the overlay network.
The average end-to-end MAODV delay for the multicast data payload
increases steadily with number of sources for both the overlay and the message
exchange-based time synchronization schemes. When the number of senders is 5,
there is a lot of congestion in the network since each of the 5 sources send 64-byte
packets at the rate of 10 packets per second. Hence the increase in delay.
However, in the DTS case, the delay is comparable to that of the UAV case for a
single sender scenario. As the number of senders increases, the number of time
synchronization requests and replies in the network increases exponentially in the
order of the group size. This explains the steep increase in delay for the DTS
case. This shows that the direct time synchronization schemes involving message
exchanges between the sender and receiver do not scale well and cause delays in
routing. The overlay-to-MANET communication is at a different frequency and
hence its a separate channel and there is no added contention. For better
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performance, it is thus advisable to employ such off-channel methods of
bootstrapping and time synchronization.
5.4 Simulation Results for Mobile Scenarios
In this experiment,the mobility speed was varied between 0 and 10 m/s
(0.15, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10). The model consisted of 75 nodes randomly placed in the
network. 50 multicast group members were randomly chosen from these 75
nodes. We performed our simulations with a single source. The source generated
64-byte packets at the rate of 10 packets/sec.
We used the random way-point model [5] to generate the movement files for our
simulations. In this model, each node selects a random destination in the
1000m × 1000m space and moves to that destination at a speed uniformly
distributed between a minimum speed and some maximum speed, vmax. Upon
reaching that destination, the node pauses for pause time, pt seconds, selects
another destination and moves towards the destination as described above,
repeating this pattern of movement for the entire duration of the simulation.
Thus, the nodes are free to move to any location in the network area. The
continuous movement of the nodes ensures continuous change in the topology.
This highly dynamic network is ideal to test the tenacity of the
message-exchange based time synchronization scheme. We discard the first 3600
seconds while generating the movement scenario files. This is done to “warm-up”
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the simulation and avoid some drawbacks of the Random Way-point model.
Each simulation was run for 500 seconds. We generated three movement files for
each chosen speed. For each of the three scenarios, we collected data over five
sets of group selections. The numbers reported are averaged over these 15 runs in
order to effectively capture the random choice of group members and movement




Packet Size: 64 bytes
Sending Rate: 10 pkts/sec
No. of Senders: 1
Time Interval: 0.1, 0.25 seconds
Disclosure Delay: 2,3 intervals
Node Mobility 0.15,1,2,3,4,5,10 m/sec
Table 5.3: Simulation Parameters for Mobile Set-up
Figure 5.13 shows the plots of percentage of packets authenticated, buffered,
dropped and the average time spent in the buffer prior to authentication against
mobility speed. The UAV case clearly outperforms the DTS method of time
synchronization. For the DTS case, there is a slight increase in the percentage of
packets authenticated as the d × Tint product increases, where d is the Tesla
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Figure 5.13: Performance Evaluation for a single source, 50-node group with Mo-
bility Speed (0-10 m/s)
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disclosure delay and Tint is the Tesla time interval. We ran simulations for Tesla
time intervals of 0.1, 0.25 seconds and disclosure delays of 2 and 3 intervals for
each case. A similar trend can be seen in the curves in Figure 5.13(b) and
Figure 5.13(c). There is no steady decrease in the figures as the speed increases.
This is because of probable network partitions and the use of random seeds to
generate the movement patterns and also to select the group members among the
MANET nodes. These choices vary for different cases and the numbers shown are
averaged over 15 runs as explained above. Our goal is to compare the
performance of Tesla for the DTS and UAV case rather than performing
sensitivity studies of the metric with respect to mobility speed.
The average buffer time depends primarily on the d× Tint product. The delay
for the DTS case is marginally higher than the UAV case. This is because of the
packets stored in the temporary packet buffer until time synchronization
information in available. The packet arrival time is noted and these packets are
buffered. The security condition is evaluated only after the time synchronization
and bootstrap information are available. This extra time to get the required
information is reflected by an additional delay for the packets in the temporary
buffer.
Figure 5.14(a) shows the average receiver-to-sender clock dispersion as
calculated by the DTS method. The dispersion for the UAV case is the
pessimistic estimate of 0.001 seconds, as explained in Section 5.1 in the beginning
of this chapter. The dispersion for the DTS case is significantly higher. The
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Figure 5.14: MAODV Delay and Clock Dispersion
receiver has to find a route (unicast) to the sender and get the time
synchronization information. The scenarios used have an average of 6 to 7 hops.
There is no fixed trend with increase in mobility. There may be a partition in the
network at a lower speed and none at a higher speed. We use the random
way-point model and network conditions may vary from one speed to another.
However, it is evident that the high dispersion in the DTS case causes the
security condition to be violated more often and hence the poor performance
metrics, as shown in Figure 5.13. Figure 5.13(b) shows the average end to end
delay for a multicast packet. The delay again does not follow any trend with
increasing mobility due to reasons explained above. The delay is more for the
DTS case because of increase in CBR traffic in the network due to the flooding of
time synchronization requests and replies.
Tesla performs well even in mobile scenarios for the UAV case. Thus, it is
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clear that the authentication scheme is suitable for multicast settings in
MANETs. The DTS scheme delays the authentication process and causes a lot of
packet drops due to violation of security condition and non-availability of time
synchronization information. Whereas use of UAV for the same guarantees high




Conclusions and Future Work
In this chapter, we first present a brief qualitative security analysis of the chosen
authentication scheme. This is followed by the conclusions drawn from
simulation results presented in the previous chapter. In the last section, we
briefly outline the future work and the motivation for performing the
comparisons listed under future work.
6.1 Security Analysis
Tesla guarantees source authentication and message integrity in the following
ways:
1. All messages that do not satisfy the security condition at the receiver are
discarded. The security condition (4.1) makes sure that the key used to
compute the MAC of a packet’s data portion is known only to the sender at
the time of arrival at the receiver. This guarantees that only messages sent
by the purported sender are accepted.
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2. Packets that satisfy the security condition are buffered and on receipt of
the key, the MAC is verified by the receiver. Packets whose MAC does not
verify are discarded. This guarantees the integrity of accepted messages.
The security condition thus prevents a packet that was modified in transit from
being authenticated. It also prevents an intermediate node from masquerading as
the sender. However, a malicious node can copy the “data” portion of the packet
and replace the MAC with a MAC using its key. The scheme thus does not
provide non-repudiation.
Indirect time synchronization wards off Denial of Service (DoS) attacks at the
sender. Our overlay architecture prevents a DoS attack at the sender. However, if
the overlay is used for bootstrapping, there is a possibility of the UAV(s) getting
overwhelmed by requests from MANET nodes. Firstly, since MANET nodes have
to pass through some special nodes (super-nodes) to pass on a bootstrap-request
to the UAV, checks could be added in such nodes to prevent a bottleneck at the
UAV. There is a possibility of DoS in these super-nodes. Since UAVs are
powerful nodes, monitoring and policing can be done with ease. Secondly, as
described in Section 4.3, the bootstrapping mechanism is made adaptive by the
overlay network. If a node fails to get the required bootstrap information from
the overlay, it sends a request to the sender in the conventional way. Thirdly,
communication with the UAVs takes place at a different frequency from the
MANET communication and hence will not directly affect the network since this
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is a separate channel.
DoS at the receiver side can be created in many ways and has been analyzed
in detail in [18]. Delayed packets will violate the security condition. Replay
packets do not do much harm since a duplicated packet is accepted by the
receiver only within a very short time period as the security condition is violated.
Receivers reject packets if a malicious node tries to create a DoS attack by
sending packets marked as being from an interval in the future as the security
condition will be violated. Replay can be prevented by adding sequence numbers
in the MAC.
However, the scheme cannot prevent a legitimate member from turning
malicious and stop forwarding packets. It cannot detect a compromised node.
Neither does it prevent a node from generating a false route error message. It
does not prevent all DoS attacks. Worm-hole detection is also not a problem
addressed by the authentication scheme. All these are problems that the routing
protocol must handle. We stress that although these routing attacks can affect
communication in the system, it will not breach the security of the
authentication scheme, i.e. it will not force spurious packets to be authenticated.
The security is not compromised. However, the performance is affected since the
authentication scheme depends on the timely arrival of the key disclosure
packets, bootstrap and time synchronization information, all of which heavily
depend on proper functioning of the routing protocol.
We summarize the key points discussed above.
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• Authentication, Integrity are guaranteed.
• Confidentiality can be achieved if needed.
• Non-repudiation is not provided.
• DoS at sender is eliminated in the UAV case.
DoS at the receiver is kept in check by using sequence numbers.
There is a possibility of DoS at the UAV and super-node if the overlay is
used for bootstrapping.
6.2 Conclusions
From the simulation results presented in the previous chapter, it is evident that
Tesla is well-suited for a tactical MANET. Tesla is resistant to collusion and has
very low communication and data overhead. It is also resistant to packet loss and
can operate in conjunction with any unreliable transport protocol. Generating
the authentication information is inexpensive and the overhead is as low as 20
bytes per packet. We also showed that indirect methods of time synchronization
fare much better than direct, exchange-based methods. In particular, we
compared the performance of the nonce-based query-response method and the
overlay-based indirect time synchronization method. It is clear that the
UAV-based method is many orders of magnitude more efficient than the direct
time synchronization scheme. The DTS scheme degrades the performance of
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Tesla in mobile scenarios. The traffic generated by the requests and replies also
affect the MAODV end-to-end propagation delay and lesser number of packets
are received and authenticated on time. In Chapter 4, we also outlined the other
added benefits of the overlay network.
6.3 Future Work
The performance of the authentication scheme is not directly related to the
routing protocol used. The performance however depends on timely arrival of
packets. A multicast routing protocol that has less delay and communication
overhead is likely to enhance the performance of Tesla. We used MAODV, a
tree-based on-demand multicast routing protocol for our simulations. Any link
breakage triggers actions to repair the tree, making it very sensitive to node
mobility.
ODMRP [10] is a popular mesh-based routing protocol that uses a forwarding
group to maintain multiple routes between nodes in the multicast group. A link
failure need not necessarily mean reconfiguration as in the case of MAODV since
there are alternate paths between nodes [43]. ODMRP however does not scale
well. Thus, depending on the application, one should first choose the routing
scheme for multicast and then tailor the key establishment and authentication
mechanisms to perform well in conjunction with the multicast routing protocol.
As future work, we plan to study the performance of Tesla on ODMRP. We also
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